Journal of Automation and Information Sciences
Publicou 12 edições por ano
ISSN Imprimir: 1064-2315
ISSN On-line: 2163-9337
SJR:
0.173
SNIP:
0.588
CiteScore™::
2
Indexed in
The Cartel Optimum and the Reasonable Cournot−Nash Equilibrium for Fractional Objective Functions
Volume 40,
Edição 12, 2008,
pp. 61-70
DOI: 10.1615/JAutomatInfScien.v40.i12.50
RESUMO
For fractional objective functions the criterion that the classic Cournot−Nash equilibrium gives the profitability below 100 % is found, and in that case it is suggested to consider the reasonable Cournot−Nash equilibrium. The latter is a projection of the classic equilibrium on the constructed set. For fractional objective functions the production of a firm in the Cournot−Nash equilibrium exceeds the production of a firm in the cartel optimum, but the proportion of the corresponding profits is ambiguous.
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