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Journal of Automation and Information Sciences

Publicou 12 edições por ano

ISSN Imprimir: 1064-2315

ISSN On-line: 2163-9337

SJR: 0.173 SNIP: 0.588 CiteScore™:: 2

Indexed in

The Cartel Optimum and the Reasonable Cournot−Nash Equilibrium for Fractional Objective Functions

Volume 40, Edição 12, 2008, pp. 61-70
DOI: 10.1615/JAutomatInfScien.v40.i12.50
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RESUMO

For fractional objective functions the criterion that the classic Cournot−Nash equilibrium gives the profitability below 100 % is found, and in that case it is suggested to consider the reasonable Cournot−Nash equilibrium. The latter is a projection of the classic equilibrium on the constructed set. For fractional objective functions the production of a firm in the Cournot−Nash equilibrium exceeds the production of a firm in the cartel optimum, but the proportion of the corresponding profits is ambiguous.

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